Orestis Troumpounis, "Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion"

Published in the Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics

Konstantinos Matakos (King’s College London)

Riikka Savolainen (Swansea University)

Orestis Troumpounis (dSEA Unipd)

Janne Tukiainen (University of Turku)

Dimitrios Xefteris (University of Cyprus)

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how electoral rules shape party strategies in candidate selection, influencing the ideological makeup of elected bodies and subsequent policy outcomes. Disproportional electoral rules, which favor the winning party, incentivize parties to broaden their appeal to voters by presenting ideologically diverse candidate lists. Conversely, proportional rules impose less pressure for broad appeal, encouraging parties to maintain ideologically cohesive candidate lists.

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